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Stéphane Lafortune
Stéphane LafortuneN. Harris McClamroch Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceElectrical Engineering and Computer Science
(734) 763-0591 4415 EECS1301 Beal AvenueAnn Arbor, MI 48109-2122
Home > Research > DES Cybersecurity Project

DES Cybersecurity Project of the DES Group at the University of Michigan

Resilient Supervisory Control in the Presence of Sensor or Actuator Attacks

For several years, our group has been interested in studying the effect of sensor and actuator attacks in feedback control of cyber-physical systems (CPS). Our focus has been on the higher-level control logic of CPS, i.e., the supervisory control layer, using discrete-event models of the system dynamics. The doctoral dissertation of Rômulo Meira-Góes is devoted to this topic.

We started this line of work with PhD graduate Yi-Chin Wu and Professor Raymond Kwong of the University of Toronto, Canada, and continued with Professor Lilian Kawakami Carvalho of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. These efforts led to the journal paper below, where we considered different scenarios of compromised sensors and/or actuators at the supervisory control layer of feedback control loops:

Rômulo Meira-Góes then joined our efforts as a doctoral student. So did new collaborator Professor Eunsuk Kang of CMU, USA. We focused on sensor deception attacks and examined first the synthesis problem from the viewpoint of the attacker, using both logical and stochastic models, in the papers:

We also looked at exploiting a notion of abstraction to make the synthesis of attacks more tractable, with collaborator Professor Sahar Mohajerani of Chalmers University, Sweden:

We then turned our attention to various defense mechanisms against sensor deception attacks, resulting in the following papers, many written in collaboration with Dr. Hervé Marchand of IRISA:

Along with Dr. Christoforos Keroglou (then with KTH, Sweden), we considered the detection of attacks in the paper:

Another line of investigation is the case of communication/computer protocols subject to person-in-the-middle attacks, which MS student Shoma Matsui considered in the paper:

Financial acknowledgement: We acknowledge in the papers above the sponsors that have made this work possible, principally the US National Science Foundation.

We welcome your comments.